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ABSTRACT 
     The A-H premium is a long standing puzzle facing Chinese stock market. This 
paper finds that this premium can be largely explained by its exposure to Chinese 
special treatment (ST) stocks, which have high delisting risk. The exposure to the ST 
index explains more than half of the variations of the A-H premium. A positive 
delisting risk premium is estimated by the Fama-Macbeth regressions. These results 
suggest that investor speculation is the main driver of the premium, in contrast to 
previous research that attributes the A-H premium to a difference between the risk 
behaviors of investors in the two share classes. The potential effect of conditional 
character of the Chinese stock market and its role in terms of the A-H premium are 
also discussed in this paper. 
 
 
 
  iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
     Fengping Zheng holds a Bachelor Degree in Economics from Central University of 
Finance and Economics in China. In 2012 he joined the master's program in Applied 
Economics and Management at Cornell University. 
     While pursuing his master's degree, Fengping Zheng interned in the investment 
banking department of Citi group. He will join the China Life Asset Management 
Company in 2014. 
     Fengping Zheng’s master's thesis, Risk, Speculation and China's Cross-listing 
Share Premiums, was supervised by Dr. David Ng and Dr. Gideon Saar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
     This research paper is made through the help and support of professors, parents and 
friends. I am particularly grateful to my advisors, Professor David Ng and Professor 
Gideon Saar for their kind, generous and invaluable advice. Also, I owe special thanks 
to Professor Warren Bailey, Professor Alejandro Drexler, Xiao Hu, Xiaoyang He and 
Jing He for their helps and suggestions. 
 
  v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 
2. Literature Reviews ...................................................................................................... 4 
3. Background for the Chinese Stock Market ................................................................ 9 
4. Classic Theories, ST Stocks and Empirical Analysis for the A-H Premium Puzzle 12 
5. Risk, Speculation and the A-H Premium Puzzle ...................................................... 24 
6. Discussion of Speculation on the A-H Premium Puzzle .......................................... 28 
7. Chinese Market Character and the A-H Premium Puzzle ........................................ 31 
8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
1. Introduction 
     China's stock market contains a great number of puzzles that are hard to fully 
explain through classic finance theory. The long lasting premium of A shares to their 
cross-listed H shares is one of these puzzles. Nevertheless, the price difference 
between domestic board and alien board is not a unique phenomenon in China. 
Previous research (See E.G. Hietala (1989) and Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) ) shows 
that the stock in alien board tends to have higher prices than its domestic equivalent 
for many countries, such as Finland, Thailand and so on. This can be understood 
intuitively, since foreign investors usually have a low risk exposure to the domestic 
market, which means that there is the a diversification benefit for foreign investors and 
they are willing to pay a higher price for domestic stocks than domestic investors. 
However, China has a completely different story. In general, the A (domestic) share is 
much more expensive than the H (traded in offshore market) share. The average A-H 
premium was more than 10-fold in certain periods of history, and hardly negative. The 
A-H premium also shows huge cross-sectional variation. Even after China opened its 
markets to international investors and allowed short selling, the premium persisted. 
The A-H premiums for some stocks are extremely large. These premiums range from 
negative to more than 500% according to most recent data. 
     Most research on the subject relies on the assumption of market segmentation, 
which predicts that barriers between markets prevent prices from convergence. There 
are several hypotheses to explain the premium: difference in risk, difference in 
elasticity of demands, difference in liquidity and differences in the scope of 
asymmetric information. These theories explain the premium from a classic angle, but 
some cannot provide satisfying explanations for Chinese case. For example, it is 
counter-intuitive that the multi-fold A-H premiums of some stocks can be fully 
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explained by difference in the required return since they have identical cash flows. It is 
also hard to imagine that there is no room for speculation with the A-H premium given 
the fact that about 80% of trades are made by individual investors, among whom most 
are possible noise traders and speculators. 
     Using the most updated data, this paper finds that the premium is largely explained 
by the risk exposure to Chinese special treatment (ST) stocks, which have a 
particularly high delisting risk. Specifically, in the paper I run a pooled OLS 
regression of the A-H premium as a function of the risk exposure (beta) of ST stocks. 
In this estimation, the coefficient of the A-H premium on the delisting risk exposure is 
2.64 and significant at the 1% level, which means that for an increase of 0.5 in the 
delisting risk exposure, the A-H premium increases of more than 100%. Furthermore, 
these findings indicate that the exposure of A-H stock to ST stocks explains about 53% 
of the A-H premium variation, which is strong evidence in favor of my explanation. 
     This paper also provides some discussion of how this delisting risk connects with 
the speculation, exerting substantial influence on the A-H premium. Using the Fama-
Macbeth regressions, the delisting risk premium is estimated. The results indicate that 
the delisting risk premium is not negative. For the group of stocks not included in the 
CSI 300 index, the estimated delisting risk premium even reaches 12 basis point per 
day and is significant at 5% level. The result of estimated delisting risk premium is 
contradictive to the prediction inferred by previous research that the risk premium in 
China should be negative. Since high delisting risk predicts high A-H premium and 
delisting risk premium is not negative, it is reasonable to posit the delisting risk has 
certain connection with speculative demand, which drives up the A-H premium. 
     In addition, this paper not only offers the analysis of the aggregated market, but 
also offers an analysis of the different A-H premium patterns of different sub group of 
stocks.  
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     By incorporating the speculation dimension into the analysis, this paper shows 
consistency between the classic academic research and the anecdotal evidence about 
the importance of speculation in the A-H premium. In this paper, I answer three 
related questions: 1) What is the role of speculative behavior and risk seeking in the 
A-H premium puzzle? 2) What is the role of the limits of speculation and noise traders 
demand on the A-H premium? 3) Are the drivers of the A-H premium similar for 
different groups of cross-listed stocks? 
     This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews previous literature. Section 3 
presents parts of the Chinese stock market history and structure that are relevant for 
the analysis. Section 4 includes the empirical analysis using the classic approach. 
Section 5, 6 and 7 present the analysis of three research questions in turn; each of 
these sections include a description of the specific data, methodology, empirical 
results, and discussion of the respective question. Section 8 concludes. 
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2. Literature Reviews 
     The phenomenon that Chinese restricted shares for foreign investors are discounted 
relative to A shares is first discussed in detail by Bailey (1994), though it is B rather 
than H shares that are discussed. The topic of differential valuation in a situation of 
market segmentation, however, was raised much earlier, in the 1970s. There are 
several major hypotheses to explain this puzzle: the classic equilibrium pricing 
hypothesis (differential required returns or differential expectations), differential 
demand hypothesis, liquidity hypothesis and asymmetric information hypothesis. 
 
2.1 the Classic equilibrium pricing hypothesis 
     In the CAPM framework, different required returns can be caused by different risk 
loadings (betas), different risk premiums and different risk-free rates. Hietala (1989) 
empirically tested the Finnish market to show that the beta of restricted shares on 
domestic market portfolios and the beta of unrestricted shares on world market 
portfolios can explain the premium, to a certain degree. Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) 
also showed that the explanatory power of betas is significant, while the sign of the 
coefficient is contradictive to their prediction. Ma (1996) investigated China's case and 
found that the premium of domestic (A) shares to the foreign (B) shares is positively 
correlated to the betas of A shares. He and other scholars (See E.G. Sun and Tong 
(2000) and Ba (2008) ) tend to believe that Chinese investors are risk seekers and are 
willing to pay higher price for stocks as a result. Using return volatility as the risk 
measure instead of beta (Sun and Tong (2000) and Chan and Kwok (2005)), the claim 
that Chinese investors are speculative still holds. Bailey (1994) also suggests that 
lower cost of capital caused by the lack of alternative investment opportunities is 
another possible cause of the premium. However, because Bailey has only a small 
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sample of data for the early stage, this may not be able to explain the current situation. 
It is also hard to explain why the premium still exists considering the current situation 
of high nominal interest rates and the impact of wealth management products provided 
by the huge shadow banking system of China. 
     Domowitz et al. (1998) pointed out that investors may have different information 
and interpretations of the information because of market segmentation. For example, 
Nishiotis (1997) argues that foreign investors are more sensitive to change in 
economic factors than domestic investors. Sun and Tong (2000)  found evidence that 
when China's official reserve deteriorates, B shares drop deeper than A shares. This 
could be interpreted in terms of the sensitivity of foreign investors to currency risk. 
They also believe that Chinese investors tend to have more optimistic expectations for 
companies' growth, because China's government possibly overstate the GDP growth 
rate and it may be interpreted differently by Chinese and foreign investors, though this 
is difficult to prove.  
 
2.2 Differential demand hypothesis 
     Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) point out that the investors' demand curves are not 
perfectly elastic as described in classic finance theory. More specifically, foreign 
investors' demand is less elastic than that for domestic investors because of different 
deadweight costs across countries. A company's management can utilize price 
discrimination by tightening the supply of shares for foreign investors in order to 
increase firm values. In their empirical test, they found that the price of unrestricted 
shares fell while the price of restricted shares rose when Nestle in Switzerland 
increased the supply of unrestricted shares, which is consistent with the differential 
demand hypothesis. The empirical result of  Domowitz et al. (1998) also supports the 
differential demand hypothesis. They studied the Mexican equity market and found 
  6 
that, for those companies with high foreign demand, the price of unrestricted shares 
also tends to be high. Several other studies also found evidence that supports the 
differential demand hypothesis. Bailey et al (1999) thoroughly tested the hypothesis 
using data from 11 countries. They construct the proxy of international investor 
demand using flows of international mutual funds, sentiments of foreign investors, the 
country's credit rate and firm size. Their results show that the foreign shares premium 
has high positive correlation with the international investor demand proxy.  
 
2.3 Liquidity hypothesis 
     Extensive research work shows that liquidity matters, whether in equity or bond 
markets. Longstaff (1995, 2001) reported that illiquid assets can be traded at a huge 
discount that can be as high as 90 percent.  
     As for the topic of premiums for identical shares traded in different markets, Bailey 
and Jagtiani (1994) used two measures, which are the ratio of number of shares traded 
on alien board to the number of shares traded on both boards and number of shares 
traded on alien board itself, to describe liquidity effects in the Thai market. They 
found the link between liquidity and the price premium to be both statistically and 
economically significant. In the context of China's market, however, the result is not 
clear. Chan and Kwok (2005) also prove that liquidity plays a role in China's markets. 
However, when examining the premium between A and B shares in China's market,  
the results of Ma (1996) had a negative coefficient for the liquidity proxy, which is not 
consistent with the theory and statistically insignificancy. In his cluster analysis, Ba 
(2008) showed the liquidity effect is not significant for the low premium group but 
significant for the high premium group and full sample.  
 
2.4 Asymmetric information hypothesis 
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     In their pioneering work, Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) argue that foreign investors 
can acquire information more easily for big companies. As a result, they are willing to 
pay higher prices for big companies and this leads to higher premiums. Their 
empirical result for the Thai market is consistent with this hypothesis. Their argument 
can be accepted easily and intuitively. However, it is hard to identify and isolate the 
asymmetric information effect from other possibilities. For example, small companies 
in China probably have higher premiums because foreign investors do not have as 
much information as domestic investors and thus require a discount. It is also probably 
because that small companies are usually illiquid, difficult to arbitrage, easily affected 
by investor sentiment and manipulation, and have lower degrees of consensus in terms 
of growth expectation. Another challenge to the asymmetric information hypothesis is 
the it is difficult to identify which side has information edge. Chakravarty et al. (1998) 
and Chui and Kwok (1998) have different opinion on this. Chakravarty et al. (1998) 
believe China domestic investors have better information. However, Chui and Kwok 
(1998) found that the return of B shares in China led the return of A shares. They 
explain this as a result of the information barrier in China. Li et al. (2001) also found 
that return of H shares led the return of A shares. It seems strange that foreign 
investors would have better information than domestic investors. However, if we 
consider that the Chinese domestic market is dominated by individual investors and 
most foreign investors are institutional investors, this argument is also plausible. Chen, 
Lee and Rui (2001) also used the Granger causality test to examine the direction of the 
information flow between A and B shares markets in China. Their result, nevertheless, 
turned out to be that there was no significant one-way casual direction between A 
shares returns (or volatility) and B shares returns (or volatility), which is not consistent 
with the results of either Chakravarty et al. (1998) or Chui and Kwok (1998). In their 
panel data analysis, they used firm size as a proxy of asymmetric information as 
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Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) did, but their result was not consistent with the asymmetric 
information hypothesis. 
 
2.5 Behavioral hypothesis 
     Chen, Lee and Rui (2001) argue that the premium for A shares market is caused by 
overvaluation of domestic shares rather than discounting of foreign shares required by 
foreign investors. In their analysis based on a dynamic rational expectations model, B 
shares' prices moved more closely with market fundamentals. They explain this by 
possible irrational factors. 
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3. Background for the Chinese Stock Market 
     The Chinese stock market was born as a big step in the economic reforms begun in 
the 1980s. Unlike developed markets like the United States, the Chinese stock market 
has only a short history, of about 20 years. Some related markets, like bonds, funds, 
and the foreign exchange market also have short histories. This history leads to some 
unique characteristics of the Chinese stock market and creates a background for 
finance research in China. 
 
3.1 Different share types and non-tradable share reform 
     From the very beginning, one important political "mission" of the Chinese stock 
market has been to help reform SOEs (state owned enterprises). At the same time, 
there are worries on the part of the leadership that the speed of reform may be too fast 
that the reform may lead to "leakage" of state owned assets. As a result, shares of the 
companies were divided into different classes. Each class has the same voting rights 
and dividends but different costs. There are three major classes of shares in the 
Chinese market. First, there are government shares that cannot be traded, to prevent 
losing control of certain companies. This class occupies a large proportion in the 
structure of ownership. Second, there are legal entity shares owned by other SOEs and 
government controlled entities. Legal entity shares are not tradable on the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen exchanges. Third are public shares, which can be traded. Public shares 
include employee shares, A shares, which are domestically owned and traded on two 
major exchanges, B shares, which are foreign owned and traded on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen exchanges as well and H shares, which are listed and traded in Hong Kong. 
     However, this design has some obvious flaws. First, because the major 
shareholders' stocks (essentially the government shares and legal entity shares) are not 
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tradable, there is a severe problem concerning corporate governance. In particular, the 
board of directors and management do not care about share prices. This also divides 
shareholders into different group, which creates conflicts of interest between 
shareholders. Major shareholders often bully tradable shareholders when they make 
finance and capital decisions. In addition, this design makes the market inefficient. For 
example, M&A is almost impossible and the company's business is isolated to the 
stock market under this mechanism.  
     In order to solve the problems brought on by non-tradable shares, the Chinese 
government decided to embark on non-tradable share reform in 2005. This reform is 
intended to make non-tradable shares tradable, but non-tradable shareholders need to 
compensate tradable shareholders in the form of special dividends, bonus shares or 
warranties, because non-tradable shares were acquired at much lower cost. This 
reform took several years to complete because it involved a great deal of negotiation 
and bargaining between non-tradable and tradable shareholders. 
 
3.2 Specially Treatment (ST) Stocks in China 
     Special Treatment (ST) Stocks are a unique market mechanism in China. It was 
released in 1998. According to the rule, stocks that are in a "special situation" are 
"specially treated." The "special situation" basically means two situations: 1) the net 
earnings of the stock have been continuously negative for two years; 2) the book value 
of the equity is lower than the par value of the stock, which is usually 1 RMB in China. 
Generally speaking, ST stocks tend to be junk stocks.. 
     If the ST stock is not able to make its net earning positive within one year, its 
listing will be suspend. After six months, the stock will be delisted if the company still 
cannot make a profit. 
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     ST stocks would have "ST" placed in front of their stock ticker in order to warn 
investors of the delisting risk. The upper and lower daily price movement limit for an 
ST stock is 5% instead of 10%, which is the limit for other regular stocks. 
     ST stocks also have a different price movement pattern. The correlation of the ST 
index and Shanghai composite index is only -0.0888 in the sample period. These 
indexes are presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The Shanghai composite index and ST index, 2010-2014. The data is from 01 January 2010 to 24 
January 2014. The ST index is calculated by the WIND database firm. 
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4. Classic Theories, ST Stocks and Empirical Analysis for the A-H Premium Puzzle 
4.1 Data 
     The data used in this paper is provided by the WIND database, which is a major 
finance database in China. The sample includes all available data for the premiums of 
A-H cross listed companies. The A-H premium is calculated when both A-H prices are 
available. If the company gets listed in Hong Kong first, we start calculating the 
premium when it gets listed in main land China and vice versa. The data ranges daily 
from 01 January 2010 to 14 January 2014. 
     The formula used to calculate the A-H premium is as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 1 
 
     In calculating the premium, most previous studies failed to consider two factors 
that would cause bias in the sample. The first is different timing of execution of stock 
split and dividends. Second is the impact of non tradable share reform. Using adjusted 
price instead of regular price in the sample would solve both problems. 
     Even though A shares and H shares in China have the same voting rights and 
dividends, they have different time tables. For example, Anhui Conch Cement has 
exercised a 10 for 10 bonus for H shares (0914.HK) and A shares (600585.SZ) on 30 
Apr 2010 and 21 Jun 2010 respectively. Between 30 Apr 2010 and 21 Jun 2010, one A 
share essentially equaled two H shares. If the traditional method applied by most 
previous studies is used, the premium will be upward biased. 
     Starting in 2005, the Chinese government launched non tradable share reform. 
During the reform, non-tradable shareholders would compensate tradable shareholders 
in the form of special dividends, bonus shares or warranties, which were worth 
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approximately 30% of the market value of tradable shares. This special compensation 
is only available to A shareholders and could explain a significant proportion of the 
premium, though the premium still existed after adjustment of ex-right. This means 
that A shares essentially had more rights than H shares before the reform. The 
traditional method would mistakenly estimate the premium upward, as well. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Figure 2 represents the time-series of the average A-H premium with a band of plus 
or minus one (cross-sectional) standard deviation beginning in 1994. Though only data 
after 2010 are used in this paper, the picture is able to provide us the brief history of 
the A-H premium. The average premium reached the peak of more than 11-fold on 15 
Figure 2 The average A-H premium, 1994-2013. The sample is daily from 01 September 1994 to 24 January 
2014. The upper and lower band represents the average premium plus/minus one standard deviation. At the 
beginning date of the sample, there are only 6 companies dual-listed in mainland China and Hong Kong with an 
average premium of 20% . At the end date of the sample, there are 84 companies dual-listed with an average 
premium of 54%. The average premium reached a peak at more than 11-fold at 15 March 1999. The lowest 
point of the average premium was on 18 October 1994, with the number at -23%. There are only 39 days with 
negative premium in the sample. 
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March 1999, which is a huge number compared to other markets with similar puzzles. 
The premium is almost always significantly positive. Even with a declining trend, the 
value of the average premium of 54% in 24 January 2014 is still very high. 
     Hang Seng Indexes Company released the Hang Seng A-H Premium Index 
(HSAHP) in 2006. The method they applied is the weighted average rather than 
arithmetic average method applied in this paper. However, the time series movements 
of average premium and HSAHP are very similar. HASHP is always lower than 
average premium in the sample period, which means that companies with larger 
market capitalization tend to have lower premiums. 
 
 
Figure 3 Average premium and Hang Seng A-H Premium Index (HSAHP), 2006-2014. Hang Seng A-H 
Premium Index (HSAHP) represents the ratio of total market capitalization calculated by A shares prices to 
total market capitalization calculated by H shares prices for A-H dual listed companies. The higher line in 
the figure represents the average premium plus one in order to convert premium into the comparable ratio.  
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4.2 Methodology 
     Based on four classic hypotheses (differential risk hypothesis, differential demand 
hypothesis, liquidity hypothesis and asymmetric information hypothesis), several 
proxies are used in this paper to capture these factors as has been done in previous 
work. The objective of this regression is to examine whether these hypotheses hold or 
still hold for recent data. It is also helpful for us to provide some useful evidence in the 
analysis for the A-H premium puzzle. These hypotheses and factors are not isolated 
and their explanatory power also needs to be examined in detail. 
     Risks and their loadings, as indicated by classic finance theory, should be the major 
causes of different required return rates. In the CAPM framework, the appropriate risk 
measure used in pricing is beta and the required return should be set by different betas 
to different equilibrium portfolios. In the Chinese case, if we assume market 
segmentation,  the required return of A shares should be determined by the risk 
exposed to the Chinese market portfolios and the required return of H shares should be 
determined by the risk exposed to the world equilibrium market portfolio. Bailey and 
Jagtiani (1994) used betas as the measure of risk. Some other previous work (See E.G. 
Chan and Kwok (2005)), however, used total risk (variance or standard deviation) as a 
proxy of risk because it was believed to be a better measure of risk in emerging 
markets. In this paper, I choose both standard deviation of returns (total risk) and betas 
as measures of risk. If the hypothesis holds, it would be expected that the A-H 
premium declines as relative total risk increases, if we assume that investors in both 
the Chinese domestic market and Hong Kong market are risk averse. Otherwise, if the 
Chinese domestic investors are still "risk seeking" as described by Ma (1996), the A-H 
premium should have positive and significant exposure to risk factors. 
     According to the differential hypothesis, the relatively high A-H premium is the 
result of a large demand for stocks from domestic investors and a limited supply of 
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stocks. The hypothesis implies when there is a greater supply of A compared to H 
shares, the A-H premium will decline. Considering that non-tradable A shares cannot 
determine price, I use the ratio of the number of free floating A shares to the number 
of H shares as a measure of relative A-H stocks supply, as did most previous work. 
     The liquidity hypothesis predicts that the A-H premium will be higher if A shares 
are more liquid than H shares because investors tend to require higher returns for 
illiquid stocks. Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) used the ratio of volume of alien shares to 
total shares outstanding as a measure of relative liquidity, while relative turnover ratio 
is also a popular proxy to measure relative liquidity. I apply both measures in this 
paper. The liquidity hypothesis predicts that the A-H premium should rise as the 
relative liquidity ratio increases. 
     Asymmetric information is usually measured empirically by firm size. It is asserted 
that bigger companies tend to have more information available to international 
investors. If this hypothesis holds, we should find the firm size negatively correlated 
with the A-H premium. In the context of the Chinese market, I posit that total firm 
value (calculated by total number of shares outstanding) is a better to measure firm 
size, as opposed to free floating firm value (calculated by number of free floating 
shares), because there is a possibility that some big companies have a large proportion 
of non-tradable shares for political reasons and free floating firm value would distort 
the information. As predicted by Figure 3, firm size should be significantly negatively 
correlated with the A-H premium. 
     The regression method is similar to Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) and Ma (1996). The 
regression formula and explanations are as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏1 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏2 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏3
∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + +𝑏𝑏4 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+ 𝜀𝜀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  
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Where 
     𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = Daily A-H premium for stock i at time t. The period starts from 01 
January 2010 to 24 January 2014; 
     𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =  Betas against different markets (represented by the Shanghai 
Composite Index or MSCI World Index for either A or H shares) for stock i or the 
standard deviation of A shares return/standard deviation of H shares return for stock i 
at time t; 
     𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = Ratio of Number of free floating A shares/ Number of H shares 
for stock i at time t; 
     𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = Turnover of A shares (calculated by number of free floating 
A shares)/turnover of H shares or volume of A shares/volume of H shares for stock i at 
time t; 
     𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =  Total market capitalization of stock i at 
time t. 
 
4.3 Empirical results of  pooled OLS regression 
     Table 1 summarizes the results of the regressions. The regression is based on 
pooled OLS method. 
     First, the coefficients of risk factors are positive but not significant statistically. 
This does not support the conclusion made by most previous research about Chinese 
investors, which is that Chinese investors are risk seekers (See E.G. Ma (1996); Chan 
and Kwok (2005)). (Actually it is questionable to say that Chinese domestic investors 
are risk seekers here based only on the positive exposure of the A-H premium to risk 
factors. Detailed discussion is included in later sections). The reason why risk factors 
are not significant is that the double clustering robust standard error are used in this 
paper. As pointed out by Thompson (2011) more robust standard error formulas tend 
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to have less bias, but more variance. Actually, in unreported results, the coefficients of 
risk factors are significant if white robust standard error or standard error clustered by 
time are applied, which is consistent with the result of previous work where white 
robust standard error is commonly applied. (See E.G. Ma (1996)). The sign of 
coefficient of risk factors is the major difference between the Chinese stock market 
and other international markets. For example, Hietala (1989), in his analysis of 
Finland's market, found that the exposure of the premium to risk factor is negative. 
     Second, the result provides supporting evidence for the differential demand 
hypothesis. The A-H premium is negatively correlated with relative supply of A to H 
shares. This means that when a company chooses to issue more A shares compared to 
H shares, the A-H premium will drop. This result is consistent with the argument that 
Chinese investors have fewer alternative investment opportunities and the A-H 
premium was caused by a limited supply of A shares. 
      Third, the liquidity hypothesis also has some explanatory power for the A-H 
premium. The coefficient of A-H turnover ratio is positive and highly significant, 
which is consistent with the prediction given by the hypothesis. It indicates that when 
A shares have more liquidity than H shares, the prices of A shares tend to be higher. 
This is also consistent with most results from previous work (See E.G. Ba (2008)). 
The other liquidity indicator, the A-H volume ratio, is also statistically significant and 
positive. 
     Fourth, as predicted by the asymmetric information hypothesis, firm size has a 
significantly negative correlation with the A-H premium. This can also be observed 
and predicted by Figure 3. This result is consistent with that of Bailey and Jagtiani 
(1994) and Ba (2008), but not with Chan and Kwok (2005) or Chen, Lee and Rui 
(2001). A possible reason is that the their data concerns an early period and the 
situation has changed with time. 
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Table 1 Regression Results for Classic Theories 
Panel A summarizes the regression results. The panel data is daily from 01 Jan 2010 to 24 Jan 2014 including 84 companies cross listed in both mainland China and Hong Kong.  
Pooled OLS is used in these regressions. The company A-H premium is regressed on proxies of classic hypotheses, including the differential risk hypothesis, differential demand 
hypothesis, liquidity hypothesis and asymmetric information hypothesis. For the risk factor, betas and total risk are both applied. The number of free floating A shares divided by 
the number of H shares is the proxy for the security supply. Both relative turnover ratio and volume ratio are used as liquidity proxies. Firm size is used as the proxy for 
asymmetric information, as in previous work. Double-clustered t-statistics by firms and time are reported in parentheses beneath each efficient estimate.  
 
 Risk Supply/Deman
d 
Liquidity Asymmetric 
information 
  
Constant Beta of A 
shares 
Beta of H 
shares 
Standard deviation 
of return 
A/Standard 
deviation of return 
H 
Free floating 
shares A / 
Shares 
outstanding H 
TurnoverA/Tu
rnoverH 
VolumeA/Vol
umeH 
Log Firm size 
( total ) 
Number of 
observations 
Adj-R2 
10.20114   0.14297 -0.08567 0.00295  -0.38254 68006 0.4263 
(7.45)   (1.12) ( - 2.36) (4.46)  ( - 7.13) 
10.21644   0.15202 -0.08971  0.00140 -0.38294 68006 0.4237 
(7.41)   (1.16) ( - 2.47)  (2.25) ( - 7.08) 
9.99070 0.10283 -0.52938  -0.09400 0.00296  -0.35556 68016 0.4322 
(5.90) (0.30) ( - 1.18)  ( - 2.63) (4.20)  ( - 5.49) 
10.00650 0.11171 -0.53989  -0.09829  0.00130 -0.35566 68016 0.4295 
(5.87) (0.33) ( - 1.20)  ( - 2.73)  (2.16) ( - 5.47) 
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4.4 BetaST and the A-H premium 
     In addition to proxies of classic theories, the exposure of return to the return of the 
ST index is found to have significant explanatory power for the A-H premium. 
     ST (Special Treatment) stocks are a special mechanism of the Chinese stock 
market. When a company faces the risk of delisting, "ST" is added to the stock's ticker 
as a warning to investors. These stocks tend to have negative earning continuously for 
at least two years. Thus, ST stocks have extreme risk, which is a different dimension 
of risk than that captured by beta. The data also shows that they have different 
movement patterns than common stocks. Similar to the logic of the Fama-French three 
factor model, the return pattern of ST stocks deviated from the market portfolio 
represents the risk premium of delisting. The risk story predicts a positive sign of 
coefficient if Chinese investors are risk seekers, as described by previous research. In 
this case, Chinese investors would require lower returns for high risk stocks, while 
international investors require higher returns, which leads to a higher premium. 
     The result of regressions provide evidence that there is a significant link between 
the exposure of stocks to ST index returns and the A-H premium. This may help us 
understand the A-H premium from another perspective.  
     In the empirical analysis, the methodology is as follows: 
     First, the return of the ST index is regressed on the return of Shanghai Composite 
Index, which is a proxy for return of the market. The formula used in the regression is 
as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀 
     The residual is the component that cannot be explained by return of the market, 
which may represents the risk premium of the delisting risk. It may also represents the 
tendency of speculation. It is orthogonal to the return of the market. 
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     Then the return of each A share is regressed on the residual noted above to obtain 
the exposure to the factor. The formula used in the regression is as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀 
      The beta loading 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃  represents the exposure to the delisting risk, which is possibly 
another dimension of risk. This beta loading 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃  is named as betaST. 
      Figure 4 shows the relationship between the betaST and the average A-H premium 
cross-sectionally. A relationship can be observed clearly that when the exposure to the 
return of ST index (orthogonal) is larger, the A-H premium is higher.  
     A more rigorous test is applied by pooled OLS regressions. The results of 
regressions in Table 2 indicates that betaST is significant both statistically and 
economically. Individually, it is able to explain about 53% of the variability in the A-
H premium. The coefficient of betaST is 2.64, which means when betaST increases 
0.5, the A-H premium tends to increase more than 100%. This result can explain why 
some stocks have extremely high premiums, like 500%.  
     It is also necessary to mention that only the liquidity factor keeps its explanatory 
power after betaST is added into the regressions while each classic proxy is significant 
statistically if regressed individually. This indicates that the explanatory power of 
classic proxies can be captured by betaST. 
     The positive coefficient of betaST, based on classic finance theory, means that in 
Chinese market investors tend to pay much higher prices for stocks that look like ST 
stocks that have the risk of being delisted, which is consistent with the plausible risk 
seeking story described in previous research.  
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Figure 4 The average A-H premium of stocks and beta against the ST index. The data ranges daily from 01 
January 2010 to 14 January 2014. The A-H premium is averaged for each company. The average premium 
ranges from -19.3% to 660% during the sample period. The betaST(orthogonal) ranges from -0.96 to 0.90. 
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Table 2 Regression Results with BetaST(orthogonal) 
Panel A summarizes the regression results. The panel data is daily from 01 Jan 2010 to 24 Jan 2014 and includes 84 companies cross listed in both mainland China and Hong 
Kong. Pooled OLS is used in these regressions. The company A-H premium is regressed on betaST(orthogonal) and proxies of classic hypotheses, including the differential risk 
hypothesis, differential demand hypothesis, liquidity hypothesis and asymmetric information hypothesis. The number of free floating A shares divided by the number of H shares 
is the proxy for the security supply. Both relative turnover ratio and volume ratio are used as liquidity proxy. Firm size is used as the proxies for asymmetric information as in 
previous work. Double-clustered t-statistics by firms and time are reported in parentheses beneath each efficient estimate.  
 
 Risk Supply/Deman
d 
Liquidity Asymmetric 
information 
  
Constant Beta of A 
shares 
Beta of H 
shares 
BetaST Free floating 
shares A / 
Shares 
outstanding H 
TurnoverA/Tu
rnoverH 
VolumeA/Vol
umeH 
Firm size ( 
total ) 
Number of 
observations 
Adj-R2 
1.1152 1.1840 -2.1314      69194 0.17 
(3.37) (3.47) ( - 4.44)      
0.5859   2.6395     69194 0.528 
(10.78)   (10.05)     
0.5032 0.2691 -0.2634 2.5401     69194 0.5316 
(2.01) (1.08) ( - 0.73) (8.45)     
0.7186   2.5696 -0.0543    69194 0.5355 
(7.78)   (10.38) ( - 1.78)    
0.5723   2.6068  0.0035   68016 0.5294 
(1.00)   (9.84)  (6.62)   
2.7248   2.2483    -0.0861 69194 0.5342 
(1.96)   (6.36)    ( - 1.54) 
2.4561 0.1686 -0.2111 2.1400 -0.0544 0.0028  -0.0710 68016 0.5434 
(1.35) (0.57) ( - 0.55) (5.95) ( - 1.77) (5.45)  ( - 1.04) 
2.4714 0.1777 -0.2219 2.1412 -0.0584  0.0012 -0.0711 68016 0.5408 
(1.35) (0.60) ( - 0.58) (5.92) ( - 1.88)  (2.33) ( - 1.03) 
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5. Risk, Speculation and the A-H Premium Puzzle 
5.1 Risk seeking and speculation 
     The explanation of empirical results, particularly risk factors described by beta and 
betaST, needs more discussion. 
      One possible explanation for the strong and positive relationship between the 
betaST and the A-H premium is risk seeking as described by most previous work, 
which means Chinese investors have a negative risk premium and would required 
lower return for higher risk while Hong Kong investors need higher return as 
compensation for risk. As a result, the riskier the stock is, the larger discrepancy of 
required return rates the investors have and higher the A-H premium. However, the 
previous research that argues that Chinese investors are risk seekers is based only on 
the empirical result that the A-H premium has positive exposure to risk factors, such 
as beta, which means that the conclusion that Chinese investors are risk seekers is only 
inferred by the fact that the A-H premium have positive exposures to risk factors. 
      In order to estimate the risk premium of Chinese investors and test whether they 
are risk seekers, two stage Fama-Macbeth regressions (1973) are applied in this paper. 
Risk premiums of different risk factors for different groups of stocks are estimated. If 
the betaST represent the delisting risk, we should expect to see a negative risk 
premium according to the fact that the A-H premium have positive exposures to risk 
factors. 
     In the Fama-Macbeth regression, I assume that the Chinese A-share return is 
determined by two risk factors. One is the beta to the market and the other is the 
betaST (orthogonal). For Hong Kong H shares, I assume that beta to MSCI world and 
betaST (orthogonal) are the factors in the pricing model. I also separate the stocks into 
two sub groups according to whether they are included in the CSI 300 index or not, 
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because of the possible conditional effect that will mentioned later. Though ST is 
unique in the Chinese A shares market, it is reasonable to assume that H shares may be 
affected by delisting risk as well. As a result, I assume 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 is same for both A and H 
shares. 
Thus, for A shares, we assume: 
     𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀 
Where: 
     𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = the beta of A shares to Shanghai Composite Index 
     𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 = the beta of A shares to the residual of ST index return. 
For H shares, we assume: 
     𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀 
Where: 
     𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 = the beta of H shares to MSCI World Index 
     It needs to be noted that the 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃  is estimated from A shares Data and the 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴  is 
estimated by single variable regression (estimated in the previous section). The 
underlying assumption is that 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡  and 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡  are orthogonal. 
This is also consistent with the data. (The correlation between return of MSCI world 
index and 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  is only -0.0009). The reason that I use this assumption 
is that the consistency for 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴  estimated in the previous section can be kept. 
     Table 3 shows the result of Fama-Macbeth regressions. Most of the risk premiums 
estimated  are not significant. However, for the group of stocks not included in the 
index, the investors indeed received compensation for the "delisting risk" they are 
bearing. The estimated risk premium of delisting risk is significant both statistically 
and economically. The estimated risk premium of delisting risk reached 0.12% per day, 
which is more than 20% per year. The large risk premium can be understood 
intuitively because delisting risk is an extreme risk. However, it is the opposite of our 
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expectation and contradictive to the risk seeking story described by previous research. 
If the risk premium is positive for Chinese domestic investors, the high risk loading 
should lead to a high required return and thus a low A-H premium. 
     One possible explanation for these contradictive results is that betaST represents 
not only the risk of delisting, but also the sensitivity to speculation, since junk stocks' 
return relative to market is a measure of speculation as well, because ST stocks tend to 
have highly subjective valuations and thus are easily influenced by investor sentiment 
(defined as propensity to speculate by Baker and Wurgler (2006)). In the regression of 
the A-H premium and risk factors, both the risk and speculation stories lead to similar 
predictions. The risk story predicts a positive sign of coefficient if Chinese investors 
are risk seekers as described by previous research. The speculation story also predicts 
a positive sign of coefficient because the demand of speculators would merely drive 
up the price. However, the risk premiums estimated by the Fama-Macbeth regressions 
provide evidence that Chinese investors do receive compensation for the risk they bear 
and are not risk seekers. 
     The risk story and speculative story can hold at same time. For example, when a 
stock tends to be "specially treated", the required rate of return indeed increased and 
the price should drop according to the equilibrium pricing model. However, the 
speculative demand also increases and leads to higher premium. This means that the 
risk factors may affect the A-H premium through both channels. 
     In conclusion, it is possible that Chinese investors are not real risk seekers. The A-
H premium is probably a product of speculation. Nevertheless, whether this 
speculative demand is driven by irrationality of investors is not tested in this paper. 
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Table 3 Risk Premiums Estimated by Fama-Macbeth Regressions 
Panel A summarizes the Fama Macbeth regression results. The panel data is daily from 01 Jan 2010 to 24 Jan 2014, and includes 84 companies cross listed in both mainland China 
and Hong Kong. The estimated risk premium for each risk factor is reported. t-statistics are reported in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. In the Fama-Macbeth 
regression, Chinese A shares and H shares are assumed to be priced by two risk factors models (classic beta/betaworld and betaST). Risk premiums are estimated by two 
subgroups according to indexing. 
 
 Beta Betaworld BetaST Number of Days 
A shares Risk Premium 0.0002  0.0005 957 
 (0.31)  (0.99) 
Not Indexed -0.0004  0.0012 957 
 ( - 0.53)  (2.03) 
Indexed 0.0003  0.0007 957 
 (0.49)  (0.84) 
H shares Risk Premium  -0.0005 0.0005 957 
  ( - 0.60) (1.04) 
Not Indexed  -0.0007 0.0011 957 
  ( - 0.64) (1.48) 
Indexed  -0.0005 0.0010 957 
  ( - 0.60) (1.37) 
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6. Discussion of Speculation on the A-H Premium Puzzle 
     In addition to betaST, limits of speculation and noise trader demand may also play 
an important role on the topic of the A-H premium. It is expected that limits of 
speculation has a negative relation to the A-H premium and that noise trader demand 
has the positive coefficient. 
     In empirical analysis, I include whether the stock is included in the CSI 300 index 
or not as a dummy variable as a proxy of  limits of speculation. The CSI 300 Index is 
the underlying index for the index future of the Chinese stock market. For stocks 
included in the index, there are more investors involved and tools to exploit mispricing. 
As a result, indexed stocks tend to be more difficult to speculate on. The individual 
holding is used as noise trader demand as described by Shiller (1984). 
     After adding these two variables, the function of the regression can be represented 
as: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑏𝑏1′ 𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊 + 𝑏𝑏2∅𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏3𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀       where i represents stocks, t is time, 𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊 is a vector of firm characteristics (classic 
factors proxies and betaST), ∅  is a proxy for limits of speculation and 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  is the 
individual investor holding level as the proxy for noise trader demand. This equation 
predicts that the A-H premium is not only affected by different required rates and 
speculation caused by firm characteristics 𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕 as classic theories and the speculation 
story describe, but also would be affected by limits of speculation ∅ and noise trader 
demand 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 .  
     Table 4 includes the result of regressions with the proxy of limits of speculation 
and noise trader demand. The coefficient of the proxy of noise trader demand is not 
significant. One possible reason for this is that the data for individual holding level is 
quarterly and with low variability. Another reason is that the betaST has already 
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captured the effect of noise trader demand. The coefficient of the indexing dummy, 
however, is significantly negative. After controlling for firm size and betaST, the 
stocks included in the index tend to have lower  premiums by about 40%. It is 
consistent with the speculation story that stocks that hard to speculate tend to have 
lower premiums. 
  30 
Table 4 Regression Results with Limits of Speculation and Noise Trader Demand 
Panel A summarizes the regression results. The panel data is daily from 01 Jan 2010 to 24 Jan 2014, and includes 84 companies cross listed in both mainland China and Hong 
Kong.  Pooled OLS is used in these regressions. The company A-H premium is regressed on proxies of limits of speculation, noise trader demand and classic hypotheses, including 
the differential risk hypothesis, differential demand hypothesis, liquidity hypothesis and asymmetric information hypothesis. For the risk factor, betas are applied. The number of 
free floating A shares divided by the number of H shares is the proxy for the security supply. Both relative turnover ratio and volume ratio are used as liquidity proxies. Firm size is 
used as the proxy for asymmetric information as in previous work. The dummy variable of indexing is the proxy for limits of speculation. The individual holding is a proxy of 
noise trader demand. Double-clustered t-statistics by firms and time are report in parentheses beneath each efficient estimate.  
 
 Risk Supply/
Demand 
Liquidity Asymme
tric infor
mation 
    
Constant Beta of 
A shares 
Beta of 
H shares 
BetaST Free floa
ting shar
es A / S
hares out
standing 
H 
Turnove
rA/Turn
overH 
Volume
A/Volu
meH 
Firm siz
e ( total ) 
Indexing Individu
al invest
or holdin
g 
Number 
of obser
vations 
Adj-R2 
0.29539 0.34807 -0.27363 2.1453 -0.05499 0.00295  0.02341 -0.39697 -0.02402 66907 0.5645 
(0.15) (1.24) ( - 0.73) (5.83) ( - 1.73) (6.04)  (0.33) ( - 2.33) ( - 0.34) 
0.26038 0.35650 -0.28296 2.1518 -0.05776  0.00113 0.02508 -0.40142 -0.02128 66907 0.562 
(0.13) (1.27) ( - 0.75) (5.82) ( - 1.80)  (2.16) (0.35) ( - 2.36) ( - 0.30) 
7.55958 0.28246 -0.59144  -0.08605 0.00335  -0.25497 -0.41345 0.03167 66907 0.4545 
(4.00) (0.89) ( - 1.34)  ( - 2.15) (5.84)  ( - 3.55) ( - 2.06) (0.35) 
7.54415 0.29164 -0.60290  -0.08933  0.00131 -0.25401 -0.41853 0.03495 66907 0.4512 
(3.98) (0.91) ( - 1.36)  ( - 2.23)  (2.10) ( - 3.52) ( - 2.09) (0.38) 
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7. Chinese Market Character and the A-H Premium Puzzle 
     Previous research (E.G. Ba(2008)) indicates that the underlying driver of the A-H 
premium may be different for different groups of stocks. One possible explanation 
based on the speculative story is that there is an interact effect between limits of 
speculation and speculative demand, which is similar to the conditional effect depicted 
by Baker and Wurgler (2006). Considering that stocks may have different properties 
depending on limits of speculation,  I divided Chinese stocks into two groups based on 
the indexing dummy variable as a proxy of limits of speculation. The group included 
in the index, like banks and petroleum companies, should has smaller conditional 
effect. The other group, which is easily affected by speculative demand, should have 
larger conditional effect. 
    Figure 5 shows the results of double sorting to describe both the unconditional and 
conditional effect between beta and indexing to the A-H premium. In Figure 5, the 
average A-H premium of stocks not included in the index (blue bars) is always higher 
than the average premium of stocks included in the index (red bars). The average 
premium also increases along with the beta level. These describe the unconditional 
effects of limits of speculation and speculative demand on the A-H premium. As for 
the conditional effect, we can observe that the difference of premiums between stocks 
included in the index and the stocks not included in the index increases along with the 
beta level.  
     Figure 6 depicts the results of double sorting to describe both the unconditional and 
conditional effects between beta and indexing on the A-H premium similar to Figure 5.  
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Figure 5 Two-way sorts: The unconditional and conditional effects of risk factor and limits of speculation. 
The observations are sorted into ten groups according to total risk ratio level. The blue bar is the average 
premium of stocks not included in the CSI 300 index. The red bar is the average premium of stocks that is 
included in the index. The green line is the average premium at different relative beta levels. The purple 
line represents the difference of premium between stocks included in the index and stocks not included in 
the index at different relative beta levels. 
Figure 6 Two-way sorts: The unconditional and conditional effects of betaST and limits of speculation. The 
observations are sorted into ten groups according to betaST level. The blue bar is the average premium of 
stocks not included in the CSI 300 index. The red bar is the average premium of stocks included in the 
index. The green line is the average premium at different relative betaST levels. The purple line represents 
the difference in premiums between stocks included in the index and stocks not included in the index at 
different relative betaST levels. 
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     To capture the "conditional effect" and test it more rigorously, I add cross terms 
into the "unconditional effect" regressions. The regression can be represented as: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝒃𝒃𝟏𝟏′ 𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊 + 𝑏𝑏2∅𝒊𝒊 + 𝑏𝑏3∅𝒊𝒊𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃 + 𝑏𝑏4∅𝒊𝒊𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 + 𝜀𝜀 
     where i represent stocks, t is time, X is a vector of firm characteristics (classic 
factors proxies and betaST(orthogonal)), ∅ is a dummy variable of indexing as a proxy 
of limits of speculation. The cross term between dummy variable of indexing and beta 
or betaST(orthogonal) is added to capture the possible "conditional effect" model. 
According to the speculative story, for stocks difficult to speculate on, the speculative 
demand would have stronger impact on the premium.       
     The results of regressions in Table 5 shows that the two group of stocks divided 
based on indexing have significantly different patterns. For stocks included in the 
index, the partial effect of betaST on the A-H premium would drop sharply as 
captured by the cross term. This implies that for stocks not included in the index, 
speculative demand may be the major reason driving the A-H premium up. However, 
for stocks included in the index, the coefficients of risk factors are much lower, 
indicating that the speculation and risk effects probably cancelled each other out and 
have no effect generally.   
     In conclusion, the Chinese stock market has a "conditional" character on the A-H 
premium issue. This structure is possibly caused by the limits of speculation, which 
finally makes the A-H  premium varies hugely for different companies. 
     The conditional character of the A-H premium issue is also found by Ba (2008), 
who found that high premium stocks have different patterns than low premium stocks. 
However, he did not point out the underlying reason why the group should be sorted 
by premium levels. In this paper, the speculative story explains the underlying logic. 
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Table 5 Regression Results with Risk Factor Cross Term 
Panel A summarizes the regression results. The panel data is daily from 01 Jan 2010 to 24 Jan 2014. Pooled OLS is used in these regressions. The A-H premium is regressed on 
proxies of limits of speculation, cross terms and classic hypotheses, including the equilibrium pricing hypothesis (differential required returns or differential expectations), 
differential demand hypothesis, liquidity hypothesis, and asymmetric information hypothesis. For the risk factor, betas and betaST are both applied. The number of free floating A 
shares divided by the number of H shares is the proxy for the security supply. Both relative turnover ratio and volume ratio are used as liquidity proxies. Firm size is used as the 
proxy for asymmetric information as in previous work. The dummy variable of indexing is the proxy for limits of speculation. Double-clustered t-statistics by firms and time are 
reported in parentheses beneath each efficient estimate.  
 
 Risk Supply/De
mand 
Liquidity Asymmetr
ic 
informatio
n 
     
Constant Beta of 
A shares 
Beta of 
H shares 
BetaSTresidu
al 
Free 
floating 
shares A / 
Shares 
outstandin
g H 
Turnover
A/Turnove
rH 
VolumeA/
VolumeH 
Firm size ( 
total ) 
Indexing Indexing*
Beta 
Indexing*
BetaST 
Number of 
observatio
ns 
Adj-R2 
2.2739 0.2659 -0.2624 2.9869 -0.0572 0.0020  -0.0707 -0.0415  -2.3724 68016 0.6237 
(1.32) (1.12) ( - 0.79) (5.46) ( - 2.37) (2.93)  ( - 1.08) ( - 0.28)  ( - 4.23) 
2.3019 0.2772 -0.2765 2.9941 -0.0598  0.0002 -0.0714 -0.0432  -2.3878 68016 0.6220 
(1.33) (1.17) ( - 0.83) (5.43) ( - 2.43)  (0.67) ( - 1.08) ( - 0.29)  ( - 4.21) 
0.0212 1.2049 -0.2951 2.0109 -0.0517 0.0024  -0.0045 0.7813 -1.0753  68016 0.5720 
(0.01) (2.30) ( - 0.80) (6.02) ( - 1.85) (3.49)  ( - 0.07) (1.28) ( - 2.07)  
2.0622 0.9952 -0.2671 2.8572 -0.0589 0.0018  -0.0935 0.9575 -0.9134 -2.3135 68016 0.6324 
(1.22) (2.10) ( - 0.80) (5.42) ( - 2.46) (2.39)  ( - 1.43) (1.79) ( - 1.98) ( - 4.29) 
2.093 1.019 -0.282 2.863 -0.061  0.00004 -0.095 0.974 -0.929 -2.329 68016 0.6310 
(1.23) (2.14) ( - 0.85) (5.40) ( - 2.50)  (0.11) ( - 1.44) (1.82) ( - 2.01) ( - 4.28) 
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8. Conclusion 
     The A-H premium is a long lasting phenomenon in the Chinese stock market. 
However, explanations given by street views and academic research are not consistent 
on this topic. In this paper, I provide evidence that the classic hypotheses may only 
partially explain the topic. In addition, I also find some evidence that the exposure to 
the returns of the ST index is able to explain the A-H premium significantly. Though 
the exposure to the return of ST index represents both delisting risk and degree of 
speculation, this paper points out that it is speculation that drives up the A-H premium 
and that Chinese investors are not actually risk seekers based on the Fama-Macbeth 
regression, which is different from the conclusion of previous research. This paper 
also argues that the Chinese stock market has "conditional" character. Specifically, 
because of some reasons including politics and market design, the cross listed stocks 
not included in the CSI 300 index tend to have high premium and be affected easily by 
speculative demand.  
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